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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between voting weights and ex-
pected equilibrium payoffs in legislative bargaining and provides a nec-
essary and sufficient condition for payoffs to be proportional to weights.
This condition has a natural interpretation in terms of the supply and
demand for coalition partners. An implication of this condition is that
Snyder et al.’s (2005) result, that payoffs are proportional to weights in
large replicated games, does not necessarily extend to the smaller games
that arise in applications. Departures from proportionality may be sub-
stantial and may arise even in well-behaved (homogeneous) games.
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Many important collective bodies make decisions by weighted majority vot-
ing. Examples are the Electoral College in the United States, the International
Monetary Fund, the European Union Council of Ministers and any legislature
with disciplined political parties. An important question in this setting is how
the distribution of votes affects payoffs. Power indices such as the Shapley-
Shubik index coincide with voting weights only rarely. In contrast, Snyder,
Ting and Ansolabehere (2005, p. 982) argue that
Elementary microeconomic theory teaches that in competitive
situations perfect substitutes have the same price. In a political
setting in which votes might be traded or transferred in the for-
mation of coalitions, one might expect the same logic to apply. If
a player has k votes, then that player should command a price for
those votes equal to the total price of k players that each have one
vote.
Snyder et al. (2005) use a noncooperative bargaining game based on the
Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model to show that a voter’s expected payoff is pro-
portional to its voting weight. They mention two difficulties in proving this
result: corner solutions created by equal recognition probabilities, and nonho-
mogeneity of the game. Equal recognition probabilities may lead to low-weight
voters having disproportionately high payoffs due to proposing power, whereas
nonhomogeneous games create a difficulty in that players may be substitutes
in some minimal winning coalitions but not in others, and it is not imme-
diately obvious what the competitive price for their votes should be. They
address these difficulties by making recognition probabilities proportional to
voting weights and by replicating the game a finite (though potentially large)
number of times (see Proposition 2 in Snyder et al. (2005)).
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Given that the proof in Snyder et al. (2005) only covers replicated games,
how far this result extends to the legislatures with only a few parties that arise
in applications is an open question. The present paper provides a necessary
and sufficient condition for proportional equilibrium payoffs. This necessary
and sufficient condition is relevant for any weighted voting game; the only
assumption needed is that recognition probabilities are proportional to the
voting weights. This condition can be interpreted in economic terms: there
is no excess supply or demand of any player type. An implication of this
condition is that, even in the intuitively most favorable case (i.e. uniquely de-
fined homogeneous weights and recognition probabilities proportional to those
weights) the equilibrium of the game is not necessarily competitive. It may
be possible for larger players to get a disproportionate payoff even if cheaper
perfect substitutes appear to be available.
In order to get a rough idea of how often proportional payoffs are predicted
in applications, the condition is used to calculate the frequency with which
the model actually predicts proportional payoffs in Snyder et al.’s dataset
of coalition governments in 14 countries from 1946 to 2001. Proportional
payoffs are predicted for about 69% of the legislatures; this proportion varies
between countries and can be as high as 100% (for Australia and Austria) or
as low as 28% (for Italy). The difference between equilibrium and proportional
payoffs may be substantial, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and this is
illustrated with some examples from the dataset. Perhaps the most important
qualitative deviation is that it is possible for asymmetric parties to have the
same equilibrium expected payoff, even though one of the parties is a more
desirable coalition partner and has a greater probability of being proposer.
Also, minimal winning coalitions are not necessarily proposed in equilibrium
(surplus coalitions in which the proposer is the only nonpivotal player are also
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possible).
Preliminaries
Weighted voting games
N = {1, ..., n} is the set of players, S ⊆ N represents a generic coalition
and X is the set of alternatives. In the legislative bargaining model under
consideration, there is a budget of size 1 to be divided and X = {x|xi ≥ 0
for all i and
∑
i∈N xi ≤ 1} is the set of all possible allocations. Player i’s
preferences are described by the utility function ui(x) = xi.
The voting game is described by a set of winning coalitions W , where
a winning coalition is a coalition that can enforce any alternative in X. A
voting game is proper if a coalition S and its complement N\S cannot both
be winning. A voting game is strong if ties are not possible, i.e., S and N\S
cannot both be losing. I assume henceforth that the voting game is proper, but
not necessarily strong. A minimal winning coalition (MWC) S is a coalition
that is just large enough to win, that is, S is winning but no T  S is winning.
The voting game is weighted if it is possible to assign a number of votes
(weight) wi ≥ 0 to each player and to set a threshold q such that S is winning
if and only if
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q. The combination [q;w1, ..., wn] is a representation
of the voting game. Many representations [q;w1, ..., wn] are equivalent in that
they produce the same set of winning coalitions. A representation [q;w1, ..., wn]
is called homogeneous if all minimal winning coalitions have the same total
weight. For example, [5; 4, 3, 2] is not homogeneous because coalition {1, 2}
has a weight of 7, whereas coalition {2, 3} has a weight of 5. A homogeneous
representation of the same game is [2; 1, 1, 1]. Homogeneous representations are
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preferred because they give a more transparent description of the situation:
[2; 1, 1, 1] reflects the fact that all three players are in a symmetric position
(i.e., they are perfect substitutes) since any two of them can form a winning
coalition. A game that admits a homogeneous representation is a homogeneous
game.
Homogeneous voting weights are not necessarily unique. For example,
[5; 3, 2, 2, 1] and [7; 4, 3, 3, 1] are homogeneous representations of the same game.
A possible approach to deal with this indeterminacy is to use minimal inte-
ger weights (MIWs); this approach has been taken in the empirical literature1
(Ansolabehere et al. (2003), Snyder et al. (2005), Cutler et al. (2014)). A
representation has minimal integer weights if all wi’s are integer numbers and
there is no representation with smaller weights (see Ostmann (1987), Freixas
and Molinero (2009)).
The noncooperative model
The noncooperative model is the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model with weighted
voting. Given a set of players N and an associated set of winning coalitions
W , bargaining proceeds as follows. Nature randomly selects one of the play-
ers to be the proposer, according to a vector θ := (θ1, ..., θn) of recognition
probabilities, where θi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and
∑n
i=1 θi = 1. The proposer then
proposes a distribution (x1, ..., xn) of a budget, with xj ≥ 0 for all j = 1, ..., n
1A large body of empirical literature is devoted to testing Gamson’s law, which states that
ministerial portfolios are allocated proportionally to the seat shares of parties in government
irrespective of the voting weights (see Warwick and Druckman (2006)). Cutler et al. (2014)
incorporate both seat shares and MIWs in their statistical model, and find that MIWs have a
bearing on which parties get into government, whereas portfolio allocation follows Gamson’s
law.
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and
∑n
j=1 xj ≤ 1. This proposal is then voted upon.2 If the set of voters in
favor of the proposal is a winning coalition, the proposal is implemented and
the game ends; otherwise the game proceeds to the next round in which the
process is repeated. Players share a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1].
A (pure) strategy for player i is a sequence σi = (σ
t
i)
∞
t=1, where σ
t
i , the t-th
round strategy of player i, prescribes:
1. A proposal, denoted by x.
2. A response function assigning ”yes” or ”no” to all possible proposals by
the other players.
Players may condition their actions on the history of play; however the
literature focuses on equilibria in which they do not condition on any elements
of history other than the current proposal, if any. These equilibria are called
stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE).3 Stationarity requires that play-
ers follow the same strategy at every round t regardless of past offers and
responses to past offers. An SSPE always exists (Banks and Duggan, 2000).
For a fixed δ < 1, all SSPE involve immediate agreement (Okada, 1996) and
lead to the same expected payoffs (Eraslan and McLennan, 2013). Expected
equilibrium payoffs are usually unique even if δ = 1; when they are not, it
is possible to obtain a unique prediction by taking the limit when δ → 1.
Calculations for particular numerical examples assume δ → 1.
The logic of the Baron-Ferejohn model is simple. Take any stationary strat-
egy combination. Because of stationarity, player i’s expected payoff computed
2Voters are assumed to vote on the proposal sequentially. This assumption can be re-
placed by simultaneous voting plus the additional equilibrium refinement that voters always
vote as if their vote makes a difference (see Baron and Kalai (1993)).
3Baron and Ferejohn (1989) find a severe multiplicity of SPE in their model, and make
a case for the stationarity refinement on the grounds of simplicity of the strategies (Baron
and Kalai (1993) make this argument more formally).
6
at the start of any round is the same in all rounds irrespective of history;
denote this expected payoff by vi. Player i’s expected payoff after a proposal
has (just) been rejected (i’s continuation value) is then equal to δvi. These
continuation values act as prices. It is optimal for player i to accept any pro-
posal that guarantees him at least δvi as a responder and to reject all other
proposals.4 Given that responders follow these cutoff strategies, it is optimal
for player i as a proposer to find the cheapest group of players whose votes are
enough to form a winning coalition and to offer each of them exactly δvj. We
say that player i proposes coalition S if i ∈ S and the proposed payoff vector
x has xj = δvj for j ∈ S\{i}, xi = 1 −
∑
j∈S\{i} δvj and xj = 0 for j ∈ N\S.
Let pi(S) be the probability that i proposes S. Any SSPE involves a vector of
players’ acceptance thresholds (δvi)i∈N and a vector of proposal probabilities
(pi(S))S3i,i∈N satisfying two conditions (see Okada (1996), theorem 2):
(1) Proposers propose only the cheapest coalitions available given respon-
ders’ acceptance thresholds, that is, any coalition with pi(S) > 0 must mini-
mize
∑
j∈T\{i} δvj (or, equivalently,
∑
j∈T vj) subject to the constraint that T
is a winning coalition with T 3 i.
(2) Responders’ acceptance thresholds coincide with their continuation val-
ues, or equivalently,
vi = θi
∑
S:S3i
pi(S)
1− ∑
j∈S\{i}
δvj
+
 ∑
j∈N\{i}
θj
∑
S⊇{i,j}
pj(S)
 δvi.
Intuitively, this bargaining model is competitive because a player with a
disproportionately high vi would be overpriced and get few proposals if any,
which would make it difficult for the player to have a high vi in the first place.
4There is little loss of generality in assuming that ties are always solved in favor of
acceptance (see Yan (2002), proposition 2; Eraslan and McLennan (2013), Appendix A).
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Replicated games
Given the original weighted majority game [q;w1, ..., wn], the game with r
replications has rn players and a quota rq. The weight vector is found by
replacing each player i with r copies with weight wi.
Snyder et al. (2005) make no claims on how large r needs to be in order to
obtain proportional payoffs. Anecdotal evidence suggests that r is often sur-
prisingly small. However, as Laver et al. (2011) point out, the link between a
replicated game and the original game may be tenuous. For example, [5; 4, 3, 2]
is a symmetric game with three interchangeable players but its replicated game
with r = 2, [10; 4, 4, 3, 3, 2, 2], has three non-interchangeable types of players.
Likewise, [3; 2, 1, 1] is a game in which player 1 belongs to all winning coalitions
and therefore has veto power, whereas the corresponding game with r = 2,
[6; 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1], has no veto players. Since the properties of replicated games
are not always a good guide to the properties of the original game, equilibria of
replicated games may be very different as well. The propositions in Snyder et
al. (2005) apply to larger, replicated games rather than to the original game.
Hence, the predictions they test are not necessarily equilibrium predictions.
Some simple examples of nonproportionality
In this section I discuss why equilibrium payoffs may deviate from proportion-
ality, using some simple examples.
The simplest examples of deviation from proportionality are games with
a veto player, such as [3; 2, 1, 1]. The veto player gets everything if δ → 1
(Winter, 1996) even though it has only half of the total weight. It is clear
that the substitution argument does not bite in this case, since the veto player
must be in all coalitions and cannot be replaced by other players.
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Games with veto players are special since the veto player cannot be replaced
at all, hence we would not expect proportionality to hold.5 However, lack of
substitutability is not confined to games with veto players, as the following
example illustrates.
Consider the weighted voting game [5; 3, 2, 2, 1], discussed in Montero (2000).
This is a homogeneous game (without a unique homogeneous representation),
and the weights reported are MIWs. There are two types of MWCs: the large
party together with one of the medium-size parties, and the three smaller par-
ties together. Let v[3], v[2] and v[1] denote the expected equilibrium payoffs for
a player with 3, 2 and 1 votes respectively. Since each medium-size party can
form a coalition with either the large party or the two smaller parties, one
would expect v[3] = v[2] + v[1]. However, there is no particular reason to expect
v[2] = 2v[1]. A player with 2 votes need not command a price equal to that of
two players with 1 vote each, since no two players with 1 vote are available to
replace the player with 2 votes.6
Example 1 Consider the weighted voting game [5; 3, 2, 2, 1]. Let θ =
(
3
8
, 2
8
, 2
8
, 1
8
)
.
It is easy to see that v 6= (3
8
, 2
8
, 2
8
, 1
8
)
. All SSPE have v[3] =
5
14
, v[2] =
4
14
and
v[1] =
1
14
.
Proof. See Online Appendix.
Note that equilibrium payoffs are quite different from the MIWs we started
from. In particular, the ratios v[3]/v[1] and v[2]/v[1] are 5 and 4 respectively
instead of 3 and 2. Intuitively, there is an excess demand for the medium-
size players. There is competition for the medium-size players, since they are
5Indeed, Snyder et al. (2005) exclude games with veto players from their analysis.
6Situations where one player cannot be replaced by smaller players in a MWC are known
as games with steps (see Ostmann (1987)).
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needed by both the large and the small player, and there is no competition
at all for the small player. As a result, the medium-size players receive too
many proposals and the other two players do not receive enough proposals to
sustain payoffs proportional to θ.
The ambiguity of the perfect substitutes argument (or, equivalently, the
lack of uniqueness of the homogeneous representation) is not the only reason
why equilibrium payoffs may differ from the MIWs. The following example
illustrates the lack of proportionality of equilibrium payoffs in a particularly
surprising setting, where this issue does not arise.
Example 2 Consider the game [20; 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]. There are
two types of MWC in this game: four of the large players, or three of the large
players together with five of the small players. The game is clearly homo-
geneous; furthermore, it has a unique homogeneous representation (up to a
multiplicative constant). The substitutability argument points in a very clear
direction: a large player can be replaced by five small players, and should get
five times as much. Suppose players are recognized with probabilities propor-
tional to their voting weight, i.e., a large player is recognized with probability
5
34
and a small player is recognized with probability 1
34
. It turns out that the
equilibrium is such that v[5] =
50
331
and v[1] =
9
331
. Hence, the large players are
getting a disproportionately high payoff since v[5] > 5v[1].
Proof. In order to show that this is an equilibrium, we need to find strate-
gies that lead to the expected payoffs and are optimal given the expected pay-
offs. The strategies are as follows: all players propose a coalition of three large
players and five small players, and the proposer offers the coalition partners
either 50
331
(for large players) or 9
331
(for small players). As a responder, a large
player votes in favor of any proposal that gives him at least 50
331
, and a small
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player votes in favor of any proposal that gives him at least 9
331
. Proposers
are acting optimally given the responders’ prices: no other winning coalition
would be cheaper. Responders are acting optimally provided that expected
payoffs are indeed those, so it only remains to check that expected payoffs are
as assumed given the strategies:
v[5] =
5
34
[
1− 2× 50
331
− 5× 9
331
]
+
20
34
2
4
50
331
+
9
34
3
5
50
331
=
50
331
v[1] =
1
34
[
1− 3× 50
331
− 4× 9
331
]
+
25
34
5
9
9
331
+
8
34
4
8
9
331
=
9
331
.
It is tempting to conclude that the trouble with the previous example is
that there are not enough smaller players to replace the large players. All
coalitions that form in equilibrium are of type [55511111]. Proposers would
rather replace one of the coalition partners of type [5] with five players of type
[1], but this is not possible because there are only nine of those and five are
already in the coalition. Indeed, adding another small player would lead to
proportional payoffs. Interestingly, this is not the whole story: removing one
of the small players would also lead to proportional payoffs (more on this in
the next section).
A necessary and sufficient condition for propor-
tionality
Balanced collections of coalitions
Given a weighted voting game [q;w1, ..., wn], let W
∗ denote the collection of
winning coalitions with minimum total weight, i.e., W ∗ = arg minS∈W
∑
i∈S wi.
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If the prices players charge for their cooperation are proportional to the weights,
W ∗ is the set of coalitions that are likely to form since they are the cheapest.
But are those prices competitive? Suppose a player i belongs to all coalitions
in W ∗, and another player j does not belong to any of them. Clearly, player
i is underpriced relative to j. More generally, even if all players belong to at
least one coalition in W ∗, no player should be systematically overrepresented
or underrepresented in the list of cheapest coalitions. This idea is formalized
by requiring that W ∗ is a weakly balanced collection of coalitions (the defini-
tion of a balanced collection of coalitions goes back to Bondareva (1963); see
also Shapley (1967)).
Definition 3 Let W ∗ be the set of winning coalitions with minimum total
weight. For each S ∈ W ∗, let λS ≥ 0 be a weight assigned to S. The set W ∗ is
weakly balanced if there is a set of weights (λS)S∈W ∗ such that for every voter
i ∈ N it is the case that ∑S3i λS = 1.
The property of weak7 balancedness can be interpreted as follows. If W ∗ is
weakly balanced, we can construct a probability distribution over the coalitions
in W ∗ such that all players are equally likely to be in the coalition that forms.
This probability distribution is found by renormalizing the weights so that
they add up to 1, i.e. p(S) = λS∑
T∈W∗ λT
for each S ∈ W ∗.
The collection of coalitions W ∗ is weakly balanced if and only if the fol-
lowing system of equations has a solution. Find (λS)S∈W ∗ such that∑
S3i
λS = 1 for all i ∈ N (1)
λS ≥ 0 for all S ∈ W ∗
I now illustrate the definition with some examples.
7The word ”weak” refers to the fact that λS ≥ 0 is required rather than λS > 0.
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Example 4 Consider the game [3; 2, 1, 1, 1]. All MWCs have the same to-
tal weight, hence W ∗ = Wm = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3, 4}}. The relevant
system of equations is
λ{1,2} + λ{1,3} + λ{1,4} = 1
λ{1,2} + λ{2,3,4} = 1
λ{1,3} + λ{2,3,4} = 1
λ{1,4} + λ{2,3,4} = 1
λ{1,2}, λ{1,3}, λ{1,4}, λ{2,3,4} ≥ 0
The (unique) solution to this system is λ{1,2} = λ{1,3} = λ{1,4} = 13 ,
λ{2,3,4} = 23 . If we renormalize these values such that they add up to 1, they
can be interpreted as probabilities of the respective coalitions: p({1, 2}) =
p({1, 3}) = p({1, 4}) = 1
5
and p({2, 3, 4}) = 2
5
. Given these probabilities, each
of the players is included in the final coalition with probability 3
5
. Player 1 is
in more MWCs than other players, but this difference can be compensated by
making coalition {2, 3, 4} more likely.
Example 1 on the other hand is a clear case of violation of this condition.
Since the game is homogeneous, all MWCs have the same total weight and
W ∗ = Wm = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3, 4})}. The system is then
λ{1,2} + λ{1,3} = 1
λ{1,2} + λ{2,3,4} = 1
λ{1,3} + λ{2,3,4} = 1
λ{2,3,4} = 1
λ{1,2}, λ{1,3}, λ{2,3,4} ≥ 0
The fourth equation requires λ{2,3,4} = 1. Substituting this value into the
second and third equations gives λ{1,2} = λ{1,3} = 0, which then contradicts
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the first equation. The system has no solution, hence the set W ∗ is not weakly
balanced. Player 4 is an inferior player (Napel and Widgre´n, 2001) in that it
can only be in a MWC when players 2 and 3 are also present; since player 1
also needs either player 2 or player 3, it is impossible for all players to be in
the final coalition with equal probability.
Example 2 is a more subtle instance of the same problem. There are two
types8 of MWC, [5555] and [55511111]. Even in the most favorable case for the
small players, which is when the only coalition type that forms is [55511111], it
is still the case that a type [5] player ends up in the coalition with probability
3
5
, whereas a type [1] player only ends up in the coalition with probability
5
9
< 3
5
.
Either adding or removing a player of type [1] to example 2 would make the
balancedness property hold. Adding a player would introduce a new type of
MWC that favors the small players, [551111111111]. Removing a player leaves
the two types of MWC unchanged, but it gives individual type [1] players a
greater chance of being part of coalition type [55511111].
The result
The main result of this paper is that weak balancedness of the set W ∗ is
a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium with
proportional payoffs.
Proposition 5 Let [q;w1, ..., wn] be an arbitrary weighted majority game, nor-
malized so that
∑
i∈N wi = 1, and let θ = w. There exists an SSPE with v = w
8Note that it is sufficient to search for solutions of system (1) such that λS = λS′ if S
and S′ are of the same type. If a solution to the system exists, a symmetric solution must
also exist (given an asymmetric solution, we can construct a symmetric one by setting each
λS equal to the average weight of coalitions of that type).
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if and only if W ∗ is weakly balanced.
Proof. See next section.
Note that the value of the discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1] does not affect the
necessary and sufficient condition. If the condition is satisfied, an equilibrium
with proportional payoffs exists irrespective of δ, and the only effect of impa-
tience is that all continuation values shrink proportionally and the proposer
advantage increases. If the condition is not satisfied, expected equilibrium
payoffs cannot be proportional for any δ > 0, and their actual value does in
general depend on δ.
There are no requirements on [q;w] in order for the condition to apply.
Note however that the condition has almost no chance to hold if w is the
vector of seat shares, since in general not all parties belong to a coalition
with the minimum number of seats.9 MIWs on the other hand ensure that all
players belong to a winning coalition of minimum total weight, though even
in this case the condition does not necessarily hold as we have seen.10
In order to check whether the condition holds, one needs to solve a system
of n (the number of players) linear equations with m (the number of winning
9For example, assuming simple majority voting, the German Bundestag as of September
2014 would be associated with the weighted majority game [316; 311, 192, 64, 63]. There
are four minimal winning coalitions: {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3, 4}. The coalition with the
minimum total number of seats is {2, 3, 4}, with 319 seats. Party 1 does not belong to any
coalition with 319 seats, hence the corresponding W ∗ would not be balanced.
10Even though there are no requirements on [q;w] in order for the condition to apply,
there is an important requirement on the game form: recognition probabilities must be
proportional to w. As Kalandrakis (2006) has shown, recognition probabilities have a strong
influence on equilibrium payoffs. Diermeier and Merlo (2004) found some empirical support
for the hypothesis of formateur selection being proportional to seat shares. To the best of my
knowledge there has been no empirical testing of selection proportional to voting weights.
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coalitions of minimum weight) unknowns, withm additional constraints requir-
ing the value of each of the unknowns to be nonnegative. Just writing down
the equations can be a lengthy process. For example, one of the games in the
database is [314; 116, 108, 108, 98, 39, 33, 29, 18, 14, 13, 11, 10, 6, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 1, 1],
which has 10,790 MWCs, of which 8,616 are in W ∗!11 As to solving the system,
note that (1) looks like a linear programming problem (each equality can be
transformed into two inequalities) except that there is no objective function;
hence the matter at stake is whether the program is feasible. One can use
linear programming methods to answer this question (see Vanderbei, 2008,
chapter 2).12
Proposition 5 strengthens an earlier result of Montero (2006). Montero
(2006) shows that, if θ coincides with the nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)), v co-
incides with the nucleolus as well. A sufficient condition automatically follows
from that earlier result: if the weights happen to be proportional to the nucleo-
lus, expected payoffs are proportional to the weights. Peleg (1968) shows that
MIWs are proportional to the nucleolus for all strong homogeneous games,
hence the game being in this class is a sufficient condition for the proportion-
ality of expected payoffs. The condition in Montero (2006) is sufficient but not
necessary.13 The condition in proposition 5 is both necessary and sufficient,
11I am grateful to Jean Derks for providing MATLAB code that automatically generates
the equations taking (q, w) as an input.
12A more roundabout way of checking the condition involves solving a related linear
programming problem and comparing the optimal value of the objective function with 1−
minS∈W
∑
i∈S wi. This method is based on Peleg and Rosenmu¨ller (1992) and Derks and
Kuipers (1997), and is discussed in the online appendix.
13For example, the nucleolus of the game [10; 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2] is ( 29 ,
2
9 ,
2
9 ,
1
9 ,
1
9 ,
1
9 ), which is not
a system of weights at all, and nevertheless expected payoffs are proportional to the MIWs.
I’m grateful to Peter Sudho¨lter for pointing out this example, which appears in Kopelowitz
(1967).
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as shown in the next section.
It is worth noting that the condition does not have a straightforward con-
nection with other properties such as the homogeneity of the game. The
condition always holds for strong homogeneous games, but may hold for other
games as well. For example, it holds for the game [30; 14, 14, 12, 4, 4, 4, 4, 1, 1],
which is neither homogeneous nor strong.14
Relation to repeated bargaining
A very substantial literature analyzes repeated bargaining with dynamic link-
ages between different bargaining games. The most common assumption in
this literature is that the agreement reached in one stage game becomes the
status quo for the next stage game (see Kalandrakis (2004)). Even though
the motivation of the present paper is very different, proposition 5 has some
implications for repeated bargaining where the dynamic linkage works through
the recognition probabilities. Specifically, suppose players play the bargaining
game repeatedly, with the status quo remaining at 0 and the voting weights
and quota remaining constant, but with an endogenous recognition rule such
that each player’s recognition probability equals its expected equilibrium pay-
off (rather than its realized payoff as in Jeon (2015)) from the previous game.
Suppose furthermore that players are farsighted within a game but do not take
into account that an agreement reached in the current game affects the recog-
nition probabilities in the next one. Under these assumptions, proposition 5
can be modified to obtain a characterization of the set of interior fixed points
14Putting Proposition 5 together with Proposition 2 in Snyder et al. (2005), it follows
that the condition must be satisfied for sufficiently large replica games. Kurz et al. (2014)
show a stronger result: weights of large replica games coincide with the nucleolus.
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of this process.15 The price to pay for the adaptation of proposition 5 to an
arbitrary payoff vector is that a) the characterization only applies to payoff
vectors x with xi > 0 for all i, while the result on weights allows wi = 0,
which is an important case since parties with a positive number of seats may
nevertheless have a 0 voting weight in a minimal integer representation; and
b) the proof is slightly more lengthy. To state the result formally, denote the
set of winning coalitions with minimum
∑
i∈S xi asW∗(x). This set generalizes
the set W ∗, which would be W∗(w) in this notation.
Corollary 6 Let [q;w1, ..., wn] be an arbitrary weighted majority game, and
x be a payoff vector (not necessarily a set of weights for the game) such that
xi > 0 for all i ∈ N and
∑
i∈N xi = 1. Let θ = x. There exists an SSPE with
v = x if and only if W∗(x) is weakly balanced.
Proof. See Online Appendix.
Proof of proposition 5
Because there are no restrictions on [q;w1, ..., wn], it is possible that no coali-
tion has exactly q votes. Let minS∈W
∑
i∈S wi := q.
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1. Necessity. Suppose we have an SSPE with v = w. Expected payoffs are
given by
vi = θi
∑
S:S3i
pi(S)
1− ∑
j∈S\{i}
δvj
+ riδvi
where vi is i’s expected payoff, θi is the probability that i is selected to be
proposer, pi(S) is the probability that i proposes S conditional on i being
15I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
16For example, if w =
(
5
13 ,
4
13 ,
4
13
)
and q = 713 , there is no coalition with exactly
7
13 votes
and q = 813 .
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the proposer, and ri is the probability that i receives a proposal from another
player.
Consider first the case in which wi > 0 for all i and each player belongs
to at least one coalition in W ∗. Then, if expected payoffs coincide with w,
the optimal coalitions for the proposer are the coalitions in W ∗ to which it
belongs. Since these coalitions have a total weight of q,
∑
j∈S\{i} vj = q−wi for
all the proposed coalitions, and
∑
S:S3i pi(S)
[
1−∑j∈S\{i} δvj] can be written
as 1− δ(q − wi). Since both vi and θi coincide with wi for all i, we can write
the equation for expected payoffs as
wi = wi [1− δ(q − wi)] + riδwi.
Dividing by wi (which by assumption is positive) and re-arranging terms,
we find δ(q − wi) = δri, which implies q = ri + wi since δ > 0. Given that
wi is also the probability of being proposer, we see that the total probabil-
ity of being part of the final coalition (the probability of being proposer, wi,
plus the probability of being responder, ri) must be the same for all players.
This implies that, if p(S) is the equilibrium probability of coalition S form-
ing,
∑
S3i p(S) = q for all i. Notice also that only coalitions with q votes
form in equilibrium (other coalitions are too expensive), so we may write∑
S:S∈W ∗,S3i p(S) = q for all i. If we divide both sides of the equation by q and
define λS := p(S)/q, we obtain
∑
S:S∈W ∗,S3i λS = 1 for all i. In other words,
the set of minimal winning coalitions with q votes must be weakly balanced.
If there is a player with wi > 0 who does not belong to any of the coalitions
with exactly q votes, this player needs to buy more than q −wi votes, and its
payoff as a proposer is less than 1− δ(q − wi). We may then write
vi < θi [1− δ(q − wi)] + riδvi.
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If we replace vi and θi by wi and divide everything by wi, collecting terms
we find ri + wi > q. Since q >
1
2
we find that ri + wi >
1
2
, i.e., player i’s
probability of being in the final coalition is above 1
2
. Let S be one of the
coalitions with q votes. Players in S never include i in their proposal. But
this then implies that player i is in the final coalition with a probability of at
most 1− q, which is less than 1
2
. Hence, there cannot be an equilibrium with
v = w in which a player does not belong to any coalition in W ∗.
If v = w and wi = 0 for some i, we can still show that the set W
∗ must be
weakly balanced. Note that players with wi = 0 trivially belong to at least one
coalition in W ∗. If wi = 0, the coalition that forms can be viewed as including
i (since i receives δvi) or excluding i (since i receives 0). Choose a player k
with wk > 0 and adopt the arbitrary accounting convention that players with
wi = 0 are considered part of the coalition if and only if player k is part of the
coalition17. It follows from the analysis above that
∑
S∈W ∗,S3i λS = 1 for all j.
2. Sufficiency. Suppose W ∗ is weakly balanced. As in Montero (2006),
we can use the weights λS to construct a mixed strategy equilibrium in which
v = w. As a proposer, player i proposes one of the coalitions in W ∗ to which
it belongs according to the probability distribution pi(S) = λS for all S such
that S ∈ W ∗, S 3 i; pi(S) = 0 for all other S. Proposing S means that player
i sets xj = δwj for all j ∈ S\{i}, xi = 1 −
∑
j∈S\{i} δwj and xj = 0 for all
j ∈ N\S. Since by assumption ∑S3i λS = 1 for all i, the strategy is well
defined. As a responder, player i accepts proposals if and only if xi ≥ δwi.
I now show that this strategy combination leads to vi = wi for all i. This
17The assumption that w is a weight vector for the game rather than an arbitrary payoff
vector plays an important role here. It is because wi is both i’s payoff and i’s weight that
we can add or remove player i at will from coalitions in W ∗ and still get a coalition in W ∗.
If w is not a vector of weights, removing i from a coalition may produce a losing coalition,
i.e., a coalition outside W ∗.
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is trivially the case if wi = 0, since by assumption this player has no chance
of being proposer and no other player offers i a positive payoff as a responder.
If wi > 0, player i’s expected payoff given this strategy combination equals
vi = θi
∑
S:S3i
pi(S)
1− ∑
j∈S\{i}
δwj
+
 ∑
j∈N\{i}
θj
∑
S⊇{i,j}
pj(S)
 δwi.
By assumption, θi = wi. Player i’s payoff as a proposer can be written as
1−δ(q−wi) since player i only proposes coalitions inW ∗ and by definition these
coalitions have a total weight of q. The probability of receiving a proposal,∑
j∈N\{i} θj
∑
S⊇{i,j} pj(S), can be rewritten as
∑
S3i
∑
j∈S\{i} θjpj(S). Hence,
vi = wi[1− δ(q − wi)] +
∑
S3i
∑
j∈S\{i}
θjpj(S)
 δwi.
Since by construction only coalitions in W ∗ are proposed and those have
pj(S) = λS, we can write
vi = wi[1− δ(q − wi)] +
 ∑
S:S3i,S∈W ∗
∑
j∈S\{i}
θjλS
 δwi =
= wi[1− δ(q − wi)] +
 ∑
S:S3i,S∈W ∗
λS
∑
j∈S\{i}
θj
 δwi.
Furthermore, since θj = wj and
∑
j∈S\{i}wj = q − wi for all S ∈ W ∗ we
have
∑
j∈S\{i} θj = q − wi. We can then write
vi = wi[1− δ(q − wi)] +
[ ∑
S:S3i,S∈W ∗
λS(q − wi)
]
δwi =
= wi[1− δ(q − wi)] +
[
(q − wi)
∑
S:S3i,S∈W ∗
λS
]
δwi = wi
where the last equality follows from
∑
S:S3i,S∈W ∗ λS = 1.
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Because vi = wi for all i, players are behaving optimally both as proposers
and as responders. Proposers propose only the cheapest coalitions available
given the responders’ acceptance thresholds (i.e., coalitions in W ∗) and re-
sponders accept proposals if and only if xi ≥ δvi. Hence, we have an SSPE.
Predicted deviations from proportionality in ap-
plications
Predicted frequency of the deviations
Because the condition in Proposition 5 is necessary and sufficient we have a
characterization, and are able to answer the question of whether equilibrium
payoffs are proportional to the voting weights in any particular case. Table
1 shows the frequency of the proportional equilibrium payoffs prediction for
the weight distributions in Snyder et al. (2005)’s dataset.18 This frequency
provides some guidance as to how likely the condition is to hold in applica-
tions.19 As a byproduct, it also indicates the proportion of cases in which the
predictions tested by Snyder et al. are supported by the equilibrium of their
18These calculations use the MIWs provided by Snyder et al. in their supplementary
material. All frequencies are computed as a fraction of the total number of observations in
the dataset, where each government is an observation.
19Another potential application is the EU Council of Ministers. The condition fails to
hold for most of the historical weight distributions (see Le Breton et al. (2012)).
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theoretical model.
Table 1. Frequency of proportional equilibrium prediction
Observations Proportional Frequency
Australia 26 26 1
Austria 23 23 1
Belgium 36 25 0.69
Denmark 32 25 0.78
Finland 44 19 0.43
Iceland 22 18 0.82
Ireland 22 12 0.55
Italy 46 13 0.28
Luxembourg 17 11 0.65
Netherlands 23 10 0.43
Norway 27 26 0.96
Portugal 15 11 0.73
Sweden 25 24 0.96
(West) Germany 20 19 0.95
All countries 378 262 0.69
Some of these observations correspond to trivial cases in which either one
party has the overall majority or all parties are de facto symmetric. If trivial
cases (defined as cases in which all minimal integer weights are 0 or 1) are ex-
cluded, the overall frequency of the proportional equilibrium prediction drops
to about 59%.
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Predicted size of the deviations
The necessary and sufficient condition in Proposition 5 provides a yes/no an-
swer on proportionality: if it fails, expected equilibrium payoffs cannot be
proportional. But how far are they from being proportional? The online ap-
pendix compares equilibrium payoffs and weights for all games in the dataset
with at most 7 players that fail to satisfy the condition (excluding games with
a veto player, of which there are two in the database). In this section, I look at
the difference between proportional and equilibrium payoffs in two examples
from the database, [9; 5, 4, 4, 1, 1, 1] and [17; 9, 8, 5, 4, 4, 1, 1].
Figure 1 shows the weights wi (the MIWs, normalized so that they add
up to 1) and expected equilibrium payoffs vi for these two games. Each bar
represents one player. Most players get an expected payoff that is not too far
from their voting weight; for example, player 1 in game [17; 9, 8, 5, 4, 4, 1, 1]
has an expected payoff of 0.278 (this is also player 1’s predicted payoff as a
coalition partner) and a normalized voting weight of 0.281. However, there are
also players whose expected payoffs are substantially different from their weight
shares, and this is often true for the smallest player type, as the online appendix
illustrates. In game [17; 9, 8, 5, 4, 4, 1, 1], player 7 has a weight share of 0.031
but an expected payoff of only 0.014. Taking weights rather than expected
payoffs as the theoretical prediction for realized allocations matters more or
less depending on which players are the coalition partners; in particular, if
player 2 is the proposer and player 1 is the coalition partner, the difference is
almost imperceptible.
Figure 2 shows vi
wi
, the ratio of payoffs to weights, for the same two ex-
amples. This ratio measures how much of a player’s weight is translated into
expected equilibrium payoffs; if expected equilibrium payoffs were proportional
to weights it would always be 1. Even though most player types have ratios
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Figure 1: Equilibrium versus proportional payoffs in two examples
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Figure 2: Ratio of payoffs to weights in two examples
close to 1, the smallest player types get only about 44% of their weight share
in these two examples. The picture can also be interpreted as a comparison of
payoffs per vote for different players. The smallest players get a much lower
payoff per vote.
A third measure of deviation from proportionality is the relative payoffs
vi/vn, i.e. the exchange rate between players according to equilibrium predic-
tions. If expected equilibrium payoffs were proportional, this exchange rate
would always be equal to wi/wn (in particular, if wn = 1, this ratio would
replicate the MIWs). Because player n often gets very little, the ratios be-
tween a player’s payoff and the payoff of the smallest player are very different
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Figure 3: Relative weights versus relative payoffs in two examples
from wi/wn. In the game [9; 5, 4, 4, 1, 1, 1], a player with 5 votes does not get
5 times as much as a player with 1 vote, but about 12 times as much. In the
game [17; 9, 8, 5, 4, 4, 1, 1], a player with 9 votes does not get 9 times as much
as a player with 1 vote, but about 20 times as much. Figure 3 illustrates how
relative payoffs deviate very substantially from relative weights.
These examples and the ones in the online appendix show a similar pattern.
On the one hand, many of the larger players have an expected payoff close to
wi, such that their predicted payoff as coalition partners is similar to their
weights. On the other hand, the implied exchange rates between players may
deviate substantially from the relative weights, and this is often the case when
the smallest player type is involved.
Qualitative equilibrium phenomena
An alternative way of looking at the importance of deviations is to focus not on
their size, but on the presence of equilibrium phenomena that would be ruled
out if payoffs were proportional to the MIWs. I discuss three such phenomena:
players that are not interchangeable may have the same expected equilibrium
payoffs, some players may be too expensive to receive any proposals, and
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surplus coalitions may form. All three phenomena can be illustrated using one
of the weighted majority games in the dataset, [13; 7, 6, 4, 3, 3, 1], corresponding
to Belgium in 1972.
Example 7 Consider the weighted majority game [13; 7, 6, 4, 3, 3, 1]. Note
that types [7] and [6] are genuinely asymmetric: coalition [733] is winning but
coalition [633] is losing. Likewise, types [4] and [3] are genuinely asymmetric
because [643] is winning but [633] is losing. Let θ =
(
7
24
, 6
24
, 4
24
, 3
24
, 3
24
, 1
24
)
. All
SSPE have v[7] = v[6] =
46
164
, v[4] = v[3] =
23
164
and v[1] =
3
164
.
Proof. See Online Appendix.
Asymmetric players may have the same payoff
Example 7 shows that it is possible for two players to have the same equilibrium
expected payoffs, even though one of the players is more valuable as a coalition
partner and has the additional advantage of a higher recognition probability.
Some intuition for this result can be obtained by inspecting the list of
MWCs. There are seven MWCs of five types: [76], [743], [733], [643], [6331].
All MWCs have exactly 13 votes except for the two coalitions of type [743].
If v[7] > v[6] and v[4] > v[3], coalition [743] would be too expensive to be
proposed by any player type, because the alternative coalitions [643] and [733]
would be cheaper. This leaves four coalition types that could potentially be
proposed, [76], [733], [643] and [6331]. Given this list, player [1] would need
the cooperation of player [6] and both players of type [3], whereas player [4]
would need player [6] and one of the players of type [3]. Likewise, player [7]
would need either player [6] or both players of type [3]. Types [6] and [3]
would be more in demand than types [7] and [4], and it would not be possible
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to have v[7] > v[6] and v[4] > v[3]. It turns out that, in equilibrium, v[7] = v[6]
and v[4] = v[3].
Some players may be too expensive to receive proposals
The equalities v[7] = v[6] and v[4] = v[3] have two implications. On the one hand,
coalition type [743] becomes relevant, because it is just as expensive as [643]
and [733] despite having one more vote. On the other hand, coalition type
[6331] becomes too expensive for anybody other than player [1] even though it
only has 13 votes. Players [6] and [3] would rather propose [643] than [6331],
since its total cost is v[6] + v[4] + v[3] = v[6] + 2v[3] < v[6] + 2v[3] + v[1].
Note that the substitutability logic applies to this example, but in a some-
what perverse way. Instead of applying to the MWCs with 13 votes (coalition
types [76], [733], [643], and [6331]), it applies to coalition types [76], [733],
[643] and [743].
Looking at the SSPE payoffs, player [1] appears underpriced since it only
expects about 0.02 even though its weight share is about 0.04. Types [6]
and [3] are getting a disproportionately high payoff compared to their weight
share but this does not result in their exclusion; instead, it is type [1] that is
excluded. Indeed, given that v[7] = v[6] and v[4] = v[3], player type [1] would be
perceived as too expensive for any positive value of v[1].
Surplus coalitions may form
The original Baron-Ferejohn model with symmetric players always leads to
minimal winning coalitions, since the proposer could otherwise drop one of
the responders and still have a winning coalition. With asymmetric players,
it is still true that all coalition partners must be pivotal, but the proposer is
not necessarily pivotal. In the previous example, type [1] finds it optimal to
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propose surplus coalitions such as [7331] or [7431], since they are as expensive
as the minimal winning coalition [6331] given that v[7] = v[6] and v[4] = v[3].
Hence, surplus coalitions are not ruled out in equilibrium under weighted vot-
ing, though the only type of surplus coalition that may form is one in which
the proposer is the only member of the coalition who is not pivotal.
Concluding remarks
This paper provides a necessary and sufficient condition for equilibrium payoffs
to be proportional in the Baron-Ferejohn model with weighted voting. When
the condition is satisfied, the set of available coalitions is sufficiently rich so
that none of the parties appears systematically too often (excess demand) or
too seldom (excess supply) in the final coalition. The condition is relatively
easy to check in applications since all equations involved are linear. Using
the condition, it is found that the frequency of legislatures in the field with
proportional equilibrium payoffs is about 69%, though there is a lot of variation
across countries. This frequency may be viewed as sufficiently high to support
empirical work, specially in the countries where it is highest.
Most counterexamples are not a result of the competitive bargaining logic
failing, but rather of its working in unexpected ways. However, in these cases
the deviations from proportionality may be substantial, both quantitatively
and qualitatively, as the examples provided illustrate.
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Online Appendix to ”Proportional payoffs in
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Maria Montero
Calculations for [5;3,2,2,1]
By contradiction, suppose v =
(
3
8
, 2
8
, 2
8
, 1
8
)
. What would be the optimal pro-
poser behavior given v? The player with 3 votes needs to buy 2 votes, hence
it always offers v[2] to one of the players with 2 votes (the player with 1 vote
is of no use to this player, regardless of the value of v[1]). The player with 1
vote needs to buy 4 votes, and buys them from the two players that control
2 votes each. A player with 2 votes needs to buy 3 votes, and is indifferent
between buying them from the large player or from the other two players since
v[3] = v[2] + v[1]. Let p be the probability that a player with 2 votes proposes
to the player with 3 votes (conditional on a player with 2 votes being selected
as proposer). Expected payoffs for types [3] and [1] must satisfy the following
equations:
3
8
=
3
8
[
1− 2
8
]
+
4
8
p
3
8
1
8
=
1
8
[
1− 4
8
]
+
4
8
(1− p)1
8
1
From the second equation we find p = 0. This means that in order to
sustain a payoff of 1
8
for type [1], type [2] must always propose a coalition
of type [221]. However, p = 0 does not solve the first equation: in order to
sustain a payoff of 3
8
for type [3], p must be 1
2
.
Interestingly, the equilibrium is still competitive in the sense that v[3] =
v[2] + v[1]. Below we construct an equilibrium strategy profile. Let player [3]
propose to each of the two players of type [2] with probability 1
2
, and let each of
the players of type [2] propose to player [3] with probability p. The equilibrium
values of v[3], v[2], v[1] and p can be found from the following system:
v[3] =
3
8
[
1− v[2]
]
+
4
8
pv[3]
v[2] =
2
8
[
p(1− v[3]) + (1− p)(1− v[2] − v[1])
]
+
3
8
1
2
v[2] +
2
8
(1− p)v[2] + 1
8
v[2]
v[1] =
1
8
[1− 2v[2]] + 4
8
(1− p)v[1]
v[3] = v[2] + v[1]
The solution to this system is v[3] =
5
14
, v[2] =
4
14
, v[1] =
1
14
and p = 1
2
.
This is an equilibrium since players are behaving optimally both as proposers
and as responders. Because of the uniqueness result of Eraslan and McLennan
(2013), all SSPE must have the same payoff vector.
Calculations for [13;7,6,4,3,3,1]
There are seven MWCs of five types: [76], [743], [733], [643], [6331]. If ex-
pected equilibrium payoffs were proportional, only types [76], [733], [643] and
[6331] could be proposed in equilibrium. It can be checked that the necessary
and sufficient condition for proportionality does not hold: for any probability
distribution over those coalitions, type [6] and/or type [3] would appear in the
final coalition disproportionately often.
2
It turns out that, even though there are five player types, SSPE payoffs
divide the players in only three groups, which we denote as L, M and S. We
now construct an equilibrium with v[7] = v[6] := vL, v[4] = v[3] := vM , v[1] := vS
and vL = 2vM . In this situation, player [7] is indifferent between proposing to
the other large player and paying vL, and proposing to two medium players,
paying vM to each (vL in total). Type [6] is also indifferent between buying
votes from the large player or from two medium players (except that, when
buying votes from a medium player, one of the two medium players has to be
of type [4] because otherwise the coalition would be losing). Coalition [6331]
would be too expensive, since on top of 2vM one needs to pay vS > 0. Type
[4] may propose [743] or [643]; in both cases it needs to pay vL+vM . Likewise,
type [3] has three coalition types that are equally optimal: [743], [733] and
[643]; coalition [6331] is too expensive. Player [1] has [6331] as its only MWC;
given the prices, it could replace [6] with [7] or/and [3] with [4] at no extra
cost, hence the surplus coalitions [7331] and [7431] would also be optimal for
type [1] (we return to this point below).
We now construct a profile of SSPE strategies. The following table intro-
duces a notation for the strategies. The rows in the table are player types and
the columns are coalition types. Each entry in the table represents the prob-
ability that the player type in the corresponding row proposes the coalition
type in the corresponding column. It is assumed that all players of the same
type follow the same strategy and each coalition of the same type is proposed
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with equal probability.
[76] [743] [733] [643] [6331]
[7] α β 1− α− β − −
[6] γ − − 1− γ 0
[4] − µ − 1− µ −
[3] − pi ρ 1− pi − ρ 0
[1] − − − − 1
Equilibrium strategies and payoffs solve the following system of equations1
vL =
7
24
[1− vL] +
[
6
24
γ +
4
24
µ+
6
24
(pi + ρ)
]
vL
vL =
6
24
[1− vL] +
[
7
24
α +
4
24
(1− µ) + 6
24
(1− pi − ρ) + 1
24
]
vL
vM =
4
24
[1− vL − vM ] +
[
7
24
β +
6
24
(1− γ) + 6
24
(1− ρ)
]
vM
vM =
3
24
[1− vL − vM ] +
[
7
24
(
β
2
+ 1− α− β) + 6
24
1− γ
2
+
4
24
1
2
+
3
24
ρ+
1
24
]
vM
vS =
1
24
[1− vL − 2vM ]
vL = 2vM
There are many solutions to this system, all with vL =
46
164
, vM =
23
164
and
vS =
3
164
. The mixed strategies are not uniquely determined. A possible solu-
tion is α = µ = pi = 0, β = 5
23
, γ = 14
23
, ρ = 55
138
. These strategies constitute an
SSPE since players are behaving optimally both as proposers and as respon-
ders: only optimal coalitions are proposed given the acceptance thresholds
1Note that we are simplifying the first five equations by using the sixth one (i.e., all
coalitions proposed with positive probability in equilibrium must give the same payoff to
the proposer). For example, player [6]’s proposer payoff is written as 1 − vL rather than
γ[1− vL] + (1− γ)[1− 2vM ].
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(vL, vM and vS), and the acceptance thresholds equal the continuation values
given the strategies. Due to the uniqueness result of Eraslan and McLennan
(2013), all SSPE must have the same v-values.
There are also equilibria in which surplus coalitions are proposed with
positive probability. For example, if type [1] proposes [6331] with probability
1
2
and [7431] with probability 1
2
, the system of equations can be amended
accordingly and a new solution for the equilibrium strategies is α = µ = pi = 0,
β = 12
161
, γ = 14
23
, ρ = 29
92
(the v-values are of course unaffected).
Predicted size of the deviations
The following tables compare equilibrium payoffs and weights for all games in
the dataset with at most 7 players that fail to satisfy the condition (excluding
games with a veto player, of which there are two in the database). For each
game, the tables shows wi (the MIWs), vi (expected equilibrium payoffs),
and two quantitative measures of how far v is from being proportional to
w. One such measure is vi
wi/
∑
j∈N wj
, the ratio of payoffs to weights, where
weights are normalized so that they add up to 1. This ratio measures how
much of a player’s weight is translated into expected equilibrium payoffs; if
expected equilibrium payoffs were proportional to weights it would always
be 1. Another measure is the relative payoffs vi/vn, i.e. the exchange rate
between players according to equilibrium predictions. If expected equilibrium
payoffs were proportional, this exchange rate would always be equal to wi/wn
(in particular, if wn = 1, this ratio would replicate the MIWs).
Expected payoffs for individual players can be substantially different from
weight shares, and this is very often true for the smallest player type, who may
get as little as 43% of its weight share. As a result, ratios between a player’s
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payoff and the payoff of the smallest player are often very different from wi/wn.
Nevertheless, if we focus on the ratio of expected payoffs to weights, we see
that many players have a ratio close to 1.
Table A1. Homogeneous games with up to 6 players
Weights
Payoffs
Payoffs/weights
Relative payoffs
7 5 5 2 2 1
0.323 0.226 0.226 0.097 0.097 0.032
1.014 0.993 0.993 1.067 1.067 0.699
10.16 7.10 7.10 3.05 3.05 1
Weights
Payoffs
Payoffs/weights
Relative payoffs
5 4 4 1 1 1
0.324 0.297 0.297 0.027 0.027 0.027
1.038 1.190 1.190 0.430 0.430 0.430
12.06 11.06 11.06 1 1 1
Weights
Payoffs
Payoffs/weights
Relative payoffs
5 3 3 2 1
0.376 0.208 0.208 0.168 0.040
1.053 0.970 0.970 1.178 0.556
9.47 5.24 5.24 4.24 1
Weights
Payoffs
Payoffs/weights
Relative payoffs
5 2 2 2 1
0.412 0.176 0.176 0.176 0.059
0.988 1.059 1.059 1.059 0.706
7 3 3 3 1
Weights
Payoffs
Payoffs/weights
Relative payoffs
4 3 3 1 1
0.333 0.295 0.295 0.038 0.038
1.000 1.181 1.181 0.456 0.456
8.77 7.77 7.77 1 1
Weights
Payoffs
Payoffs/weights
Relative payoffs
3 2 2 1
0.357 0.286 0.286 0.071
0.952 1.143 1.143 0.571
5 4 4 1
6
Table A2. Homogeneous games with 7 players
Weights
Payoffs
Payoffs/weights
Relative payoffs
9 7 7 2 2 2 1
0.302 0.233 0.233 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.026
1.006 0.998 0.998 1.035 1.035 1.035 0.771
11.74 9.06 9.06 2.69 2.69 2.69 1
Weights
Payoffs
Payoffs/weights
Relative payoffs
9 6 6 3 2 1 1
0.325 0.217 0.217 0.108 0.085 0.024 0.024
1.013 1.013 1.013 1.013 1.188 0.661 0.661
13.79 9.19 9.19 4.60 3.60 1 1
Weights
Payoffs
Payoffs/weights
Relative payoffs
9 3 3 3 2 1 1
0.416 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.109 0.023 0.023
1.017 1.017 1.017 1.017 1.200 0.650 0.650
14.08 4.69 4.69 4.69 3.69 1 1
Table A3. Nonhomogeneous games with up to 6 players
Weights
Payoffs
Payoffs/weights
Relative payoffs
9 5 5 3 2 2
0.364 0.182 0.182 0.091 0.091 0.091
1.051 0.945 0.945 0.788 1.182 1.182
4 2 2 1 1 1
Weights
Payoffs
Payoffs/weights
Relative payoffs
8 6 5 3 3 1
0.320 0.227 0.206 0.113 0.113 0.020
1.039 0.983 1.073 0.983 0.983 0.528
15.75 11.16 10.16 5.58 5.58 1
Weights
Payoffs
Payoffs/weights
Relative payoffs
7 6 4 3 3 1
0.280 0.280 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.018
0.962 1.122 0.841 1.122 1.122 0.439
15.33 15.33 7.67 7.67 7.67 1
Weights
Payoffs
Payoffs/weights
Relative payoffs
5 4 3 2 2
0.290 0.280 0.150 0.140 0.140
0.928 1.119 0.801 1.119 1.119
2.07 2 1.07 1 1
7
Table A4. Nonhomogeneous games with 7 players
Weights
Payoffs
Payoffs/weights
Relative payoffs
13 11 9 6 5 4 2
0.261 0.218 0.174 0.130 0.088 0.087 0.043
1.003 0.989 0.968 1.082 0.877 1.082 1.082
6.03 5.03 4.03 3 2.03 2 1
Weights
Payoffs
Payoffs/weights
Relative payoffs
13 10 9 6 6 3 1
0.264 0.198 0.198 0.132 0.132 0.066 0.010
0.975 0.951 1.056 1.056 1.056 1.056 0.472
26.86 20.14 20.14 13.43 13.43 6.71 1
Weights
Payoffs
Payoffs/weights
Relative payoffs
12 10 7 5 4 3 1
0.288 0.237 0.170 0.119 0.102 0.068 0.017
1.009 0.996 1.017 0.997 1.070 0.947 0.704
17.20 14.16 10.12 7.08 6.08 4.04 1
Weights
Payoffs
Payoffs/weights
Relative payoffs
11 8 7 4 4 1 1
0.320 0.222 0.209 0.111 0.111 0.014 0.014
1.046 1.000 1.073 1.000 1.000 0.491 0.491
23.43 16.28 15.28 8.14 8.14 1 1
Weights
Payoffs
Payoffs/weights
Relative payoffs
10 9 7 3 3 3 1
0.269 0.269 0.179 0.090 0.090 0.090 0.013
0.969 1.077 0.923 1.077 1.077 1.077 0.462
21 21 14 7 7 7 1
Weights
Payoffs
Payoffs/weights
Relative payoffs
10 3 3 3 2 2 1
0.426 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.093 0.093 0.027
1.023 0.961 0.961 0.961 1.117 1.117 0.649
15.76 4.44 4.44 4.44 3.44 3.44 1
Weights
Payoffs
Payoffs/weights
Relative payoffs
9 8 5 4 4 1 1
0.278 0.278 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.014 0.014
0.988 1.111 0.889 1.111 1.111 0.444 0.444
20 20 10 10 10 1 1
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An alternative way of checking the condition
using linear programming
Consider the following linear programming problem
min e (1)
s.t.
∑
i∈S
xi + e ≥ 1 for all S ∈ W∑
i∈N
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N ; e ≥ 0
Its interpretation is the following. Take any (x1, ..., xn) vector, and any
winning coalition S. Coalition S can divide the dollar by itself, but it is getting
only
∑
i∈S xi in this particular allocation. The difference 1−
∑
i∈S xi is known
as the excess of the coalition, though perhaps deficit would be a better term.
The linear program above finds allocations x that minimize the maximum
excess.2 This linear programming problem is well known in cooperative game
theory and is related to the core (in particular, if the solution has e = 0, the
core is nonempty; this is not the case in weighted majority games unless there
are veto players).
The following result is adapted from Peleg and Rosenmu¨ller’s (1992) the-
orems 3.2 and 3.3, which concern the set Wm and homogeneous games.
Claim 1 Let [q;w1, ..., wn] be an arbitrary weighted majority game, normalized
so that
∑
i∈N wi = 1. Then W
∗ is weakly balanced if and only if x = w and
e = 1− q solve linear programming problem (1).
2Rewriting
∑
i∈S xi + e ≥ 1 as e ≥ 1−
∑
i∈S xi, we see that the inequalities impose that
excesses of the winning coalitions are at most e. This number e is then minimized.
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This result allows us to check the weak balancedness of W ∗ by solving (1)
and comparing the optimal value of e with 1− q.
To see that claim 1 is correct, construct the dual program of (1) (see, for
example, Vanderbei (2008), chapter 5), where λS is the dual variable associated
to the constraint
∑
i∈S xi + e ≥ 1 and µ is the dual variable associated to∑
i∈N xi = 1 (rewritten as
∑
i∈N xi ≤ 1, or equivalently as −
∑
i∈N xi ≥ −1).
max
∑
S∈W
λS − µ (2)
s. t.
∑
S∈W,S3i
λS − µ ≤ 0 for all i ∈ N∑
S∈W
λS ≤ 1
λS ≥ 0 for S ∈ W , µ ≥ 0.
The complementary slackness theorem (see theorem 5.3 in Vanderbei (2008))
tells us that a pair of feasible solutions for the primal (1) and for the dual (2)
are optimal for their respective problems if and only if λS(1−
∑
i∈S xi−e) = 0
for all S ∈ W , µ(1−∑i∈N xi) = 0, xi(∑S∈W,S3i λS−µ) = 0 for all i ∈ N , and
e(1−∑S∈W λS) = 0.
We now prove claim 1.
1. Sufficiency. Suppose W ∗ is weakly balanced. Then we can construct
feasible solutions for the primal and for the dual such that the complementary
slackness conditions are satisfied. For the primal, let x = w and e = 1 − q.
This is clearly feasible for the primal since by definition q = minS∈W wi, hence∑
i∈S wi + (1 − q) ≥ 1 for all S ∈ W . As for the dual, we can construct
λS in the same way we constructed p(S) in the proof of the main proposi-
tion. Since W ∗ is weakly balanced, there are balancing weights (λ′S)S∈W ∗ such
that
∑
S∈W ∗,S3i λ
′
S = 1 for all i ∈ N . Now construct λS in the following
way. Draw a player at random from i using w as probability vector, and,
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given i, draw a coalition S ∈ W ∗, S 3 i at random using (λ′S)S∈W ∗,S3i. For
any S ∈ W , denote by λS the probability that S is drawn given this pro-
cedure. Clearly,
∑
S∈W λS = 1 (since the process always draws exactly one
coalition), λS > 0 implies S ∈ W ∗ (since only coalitions in W ∗ have been con-
sidered), and
∑
S3i λS = q (the probability that i appears in the final coalition
is
∑
S3i
∑
j∈S wjλ
′
S =
∑
S∈W ∗,S3i
∑
j∈S wjλ
′
S =
∑
S∈W ∗,S3i qλ
′
S = q). Take the
(λS)S∈W constructed in this way and µ = q as feasible solutions for the dual.
They are clearly feasible, and moreover
∑
S∈W,S3i λS−µ ≤ 0 for all i ∈ N and∑
S∈W λS ≤ 1 both hold with equality, which immediately implies two of the
complementary slackness conditions, xi(
∑
S∈W,S3i λS − µ) = 0 for all i ∈ N ,
and e(1 −∑S∈W λS) = 0. The other two conditions are also immediate: by
construction, λS > 0 implies
∑
i∈S wi = q. We have also assumed that weights
are normalized, hence 1 =
∑
i∈N wi.
2. Necessity. Suppose x = w and e = 1 − q solve the primal program, in
which case the optimal value of the primal is 1− q. By the strong duality the-
orem (see Vanderbei, 2008, theorem 5.2) the dual program also has a solution
(and the optimal value of the objective function in the dual problem is also
1−q). Since both the primal and the dual have a solution, the complementary
slackness conditions must be satisfied for x = w, e = 1− q and some suitable
values of λS and µ. According to the complementary slackness conditions, if
λS > 0, then 1−
∑
i∈S wi = 1−q, that is, only coalitions in W ∗ have a positive
value of λS. Also, wi > 0 implies
∑
S∈W,S3i λS = µ for i, which, since only
coalitions in W ∗ have a positive weight, can be written as
∑
S∈W ∗,S3i λS = µ.
If the weighted majority game is such that q = 1, we are in the trivial case
in which a winning coalition requires the presence of all players with positive
weight. Then the optimal value of the primal is 0, and the optimal value of the
dual is 0. This is a trivial case in which the set W ∗ is clearly weakly balanced
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since one can place a weight of 1 on the grand coalition and 0 on all others.
Let q < 1. Then the optimal value of the primal is positive, and the
optimal value of the dual must be positive as well. This in turn requires that
µ > 0 (if µ = 0, feasibility of the dual program would imply λS = 0 for all
S ∈ W , and the value of the objective function of the dual program would
be 0). We can then construct weights λ′S =
λS
µ
. Are these weights balancing
weights? If wi > 0, complementary slackness requires that
∑
S∈W,S3i λS = µ,
or equivalently that
∑
S∈W ∗,S3i λ
′
S = 1. Once we have a collection of coalitions
that is weakly balanced when only players with wi > 0 are considered, we
can construct a collection in which the result is also true for players with
wi = 0. Take a player j with wj > 0, and add i to the coalition if and only
if j is in it. Thus, coalitions including both i and j or neither are unchanged,
coalitions including only i have i removed from them, and coalitions including
only j have i added to them; the new coalitions inherit the weight of the old
ones, and, since wi = 0, i can be freely added or removed from coalitions in
W ∗ to obtain coalitions still in W ∗. The resulting weights λ′′S are such that∑
S∈W ∗,S3i λ
′′
S = 1 for all i, hence W
∗ is weakly balanced.
The nucleolus is always a solution to (1), hence, when W ∗ is weakly bal-
anced, w has the same maximum excess as the nucleolus. This does not imply
that w coincides with the nucleolus, or even that the nucleolus is a system
of weights (see footnote 13 in the paper). Calculating the nucleolus is not a
convenient way to solve (1): to calculate the nucleolus, one has to start by
solving (1), which may have many solutions and, if this is the case, additional
calculations have to be performed to determine which of the many solutions is
the nucleolus. The upside of calculating the nucleolus is that researchers have
developed algorithms and computer programs for this very purpose. Besides
the more direct approach described in the supplementary files, all calculations
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in table 1 of the paper have been double-checked with the help of a computer
program written by Jean Derks to compute the nucleolus.
Proof of the corollary
The proof of the corollary in the paper is very similar to the proof of the main
proposition. For sufficiency, no changes need to be made since the proof does
not rely on w being a set of voting weights. The proof of necessity rests on
the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Let x be such that xi > 0 for all i ∈ N . If v = x is a vector of
equilibrium payoffs for the game with θ = x, all players must belong to at least
one of the cheapest winning coalitions in this equilibrium.
We have denoted the set of cheapest winning coalitions according to x (the
set of winning coalitions with minimum
∑
i∈S xi) as W∗(x). Denote by x :=∑
i∈S xi the total payoff of players in any such coalition (what we have denoted
by q when x is a set of weights). The proof of the analogous result in the main
text relies on q > 1
2
, which is known to hold since w is a system of weights.
The result holds more generally, but requires a longer proof.
Suppose an equilibrium exists with v = x. Consider the set C of players
that belong to at least one coalition in W∗(x). Since players only propose
a coalition if it is among the cheapest winning coalitions to which they be-
long, players in C only propose to other players in C, and they only propose
coalitions of total payoff x.
Take any coalition S that i ∈ C proposes with positive probability in equi-
librium. The total expected payoff of players in S, including i, is
∑
j∈S xj = x
(the total actual payoff if i is selected as a proposer and proposes S is of course
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1). Player i may play a mixed strategy as a proposer, but he always proposes
a coalition of total expected payoff x; hence,
∑
S:i∈S pi(S)
∑
j∈S xj = x in equi-
librium, since each S has a total expected payoff of x and
∑
S:i∈S pi(S) = 1.
We can re-arrange the expression
∑
S:i∈S pi(S)
∑
j∈S xj to highlight the
probabilities pij, where pij is the probability that i includes j in the coalition
(of course, pii = 1). We then get∑
j∈C
pijxj = x for all i ∈ C. (3)
The next step is to look at i’s expected payoff equation, where i ∈ C. We
have xi = xi(1 − δ(x − xi)) + riδxi, where we are already using θ = x, and
ri denotes the probability that i is included in the coalition as a responder.
Dividing by xi, which we have assumed to be positive, we find 1 = 1− δ(x−
xi) + riδ, which we can re-arrange to find that all players in C must be in the
final coalition with probability x.
Now suppose N\C is nonempty. We now show that this leads to a contra-
diction, hence N = C.
If N\C is nonempty, at least one player in C must receive proposals from
players in N\C since C is a winning coalition and, given that the game is
proper, this makes N\C a losing coalition. Thus, if we only consider proposals
from players in C to each other, we should find that at least one player in C
is in the coalition with a probability less than x.
Taking expression (3), we can multiply both sides by xi to find
∑
j∈C pijxjxi =
xxi, and then add all such expressions up over i to find∑
i∈C
∑
j∈C
pijxjxi = x
∑
i∈C
xi. (4)
Now let us look at the left-hand side of (4). If we re-arrange the expres-
sion taking the point of view of the players j who receive proposals, we have
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∑
j∈C
∑
i∈C pijxjxi =
∑
j∈C xj
∑
i∈C pijxi. The expression
∑
i∈C pijxi is the
probability that j is included in the final coalition when only proposers from
C are considered; we know that this number is at most x for any j and it is
strictly below x for some j. Thus,
∑
j∈C xj
∑
i∈C pijxi <
∑
j∈C xjx, but this
contradicts (4).
Given that N = C and that xi > 0 for all i, since a player i ∈ C with
xi > 0 must be in the coalition with probability x, the set W∗(x) must be
weakly balanced.
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